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Abstract— Among the problems to guarantee secrecy for in-
transit information, the difficulties involved in renewing 
cryptographic keys in a secure way using couriers, the perfect 
secrecy encryption method known as One-Time-Pad (OTP) 
became almost obsolete. Pure quantum key distribution (QKD) 
ideally offers security for key distribution and could revive OTP. 
However, special networks that may need optical fibers, satellite, 
relay stations, expensive detection equipment compared with 
telecom technology and the slow protocol offer powerful obstacles 
for widespread use of QKD. Classical encryption methods flood 
the secure communication landscape. Many of them rely its 
security on historical difficulties such as factoring of large 
numbers -- their alleged security sometimes are presented as the 
difficulty to brake encryption by brute force. The possibility for a 
mathematical breakthrough that could make factoring trivial are 
poorly discussed. This work proposes a solution to bring perfect 
secrecy to in-transit communication and without the above 
problems. It shows the key distribution scheme (nicknamed 
KeyBITS Platform) based on classical signals carrying 
information but that carry with them recordings of quantum 
noise. Legitimate users start with a shared information of the 
coding bases used that gives them an information advantage that 
allows easy signal recovery.  The recorded noise protects the 
legitimate users and block the attacker's access. This shared 
information is refreshed at the end of each batch of keys sent 
providing the secret shared information for the next round. With 
encryption keys distilled from securely transmitted signals at each 
round OTP can be revived and at fast speeds. 
 
Index Terms— random numbers, physical noise, cryptography, 
key distribution, one-time-pad, privacy amplification 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NFORMATION is a valued commodity in both military and 
non-military enterprises. It loses its value when it is 
unprotected and usable by competitors and those who would 
inflict harm. Perfect secrecy is required to safeguard 
information at top secret level.  
Perfect secrecy and One-time pad encryption -  Shannon 
[1] defined “Perfect Secrecy” in cryptography: “Perfect Secrecy 
is defined by requiring of a system that after a cryptogram is 
intercepted by the enemy the a posteriori probabilities of this 
cryptogram representing various messages be identically the 
same as the a priori probabilities of the same messages before 
the interception. It is shown that perfect secrecy is possible but 
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requires, if the number of messages is finite, the same number 
of possible keys”. The number of key bits equal to the number 
of bits in the message is, in essence, Vernam's idea for 
encryption (U.S. Patent 1,310,719. - US, 1919), that later was 
perfected by Maugborne [2] by adding random information in 
a punched paper tape. This started a practical form for the one-
time pad (OTP) encryption. OTP cannot be broken even by an 
ideal quantum computer – it is a very precious asset not to be 
forgotten.  
Text can be represented in computers and telecommunication 
by the so called ASCII codes where any character can be 
mapped, for example, to a binary sequence (0s or 1s). In binary 
form one-time-pad encryption amounts to the bitwise XOR 
(Exclusive OR) operation over two bits B and K that obeys the 
Truth Table I where B may designate a bit in a byte representing 
a digitized letter in a message and K the encryption key bit (0 
or 1). 
TABLE I 
XOR TRUTH TABLE 
XOR Truth Table 
Input Output 
B K B XOR K 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
 
Recovery of a message 𝐵𝐵,  OTP encrypted with key 𝐾𝐾 (=
𝐵𝐵 XOR 𝐾𝐾), is straightforward: just XOR it with 𝐾𝐾. It results 
(𝐵𝐵 XOR 𝐾𝐾)XOR 𝐾𝐾 = 𝐵𝐵. 
As shown in Appendix XI.A one can measure the amount of  
“perfect secrecy” by calculating the Mutual Information  
𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋;𝑌𝑌) between variables 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌. 𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋;𝑌𝑌) measures the 
amount of 𝑋𝑋 if 𝑌𝑌 is known.   𝑋𝑋 could be, say, the plaintext 
message 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌 the encrypted form 𝐶𝐶 accessed by the 
attacker. In particular, for key distribution (the case of our 
interest), the plaintext will be just a sequence of random bits, 
with no pattern associated to it; and encryption will be applied 
to this bit sequence. 
The calculation assuming encryption by one-time-pad gives 
𝐼𝐼(𝑀𝑀;𝐶𝐶) = 0, what assures a complete failure by the attacker in 
obtaining 𝑀𝑀 - even with the attacker having a perfect copy of 
the transmitted signals. It should be emphasized that standard 
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telecommunication signals are being used: they can be precisely 
copied by the attacker 
Encryption nowadays - This perfect secrecy level result 
using classical signals is not replicated by many of the classical 
encryption methods currently offered. For example, public-key 
encryption and digital signatures rely on the historically-hard 
mathematical problems of factoring. Quite unfortunately there 
are no proofs to guarantee their secrecy level - instead they look 
for computational difficulties to break keys by brute force and 
accept that, with the use of long keys for RSA or algorithms 
based on elliptic curves, security will result. Basically, security 
has relied on unproven hypotheses and unsupported by existing 
physical and mathematical tenets. Faith is not enough.  
Additional menaces to these unproven methods are Quantum 
Computation possibilities. Better encryption methods have to 
be found. Some of the current options involving support from 
physics are these: 
QKD - The pure Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) methods 
can guarantee secrecy in key distribution and, therefore, would 
allow application of one-time-pad encryption (=symmetric 
encryption) with the distilled keys. However, the need for a 
quantum communication dedicated channel, the slow method 
and the overall high costs associated with QKD give no 
indication for adoption of QKD for wide use in a near future. 
𝑴𝑴-ry encoding and physical noise in optical channels - 
The key distribution method encoding bits in 𝑀𝑀-ry bases with 
superposed quantum noise is a variation for key distribution that 
can bring Perfect Security and it was developed for optical 
channels, where the quantum noise is inherent to the optical 
channel itself [3]. Although the system is lower cost than QKD, 
it is faster and has a longer distance range, it needs optical 
channels such as optical fiber networks. The literature is 
relatively vast (see examples from [3] to [25]). 
One could ask if a different combination of methods could 
create systems allowing proved and fast secure communication 
at low cost and working in a generic channel. 
Wireless 𝑴𝑴-ry coding with added physical noise in 
classical channels - This work meets the above criteria, it uses 
classical signals in standard communication channels to 
distribute keys in a secure way. The achieved security is made 
possible by the use of quantum fluctuations of optical origin 
that were recorded and added to the bit signals coded in 𝑀𝑀-ry 
levels (explained ahead). For each 𝑀𝑀-ry coded bit sent a new 
recorded noise signal is added that cloaks the 𝑀𝑀-ry level used 
and does not allow the attacker to obtain the bit sent. This 
system, known as the KeyBITS Platform, will be presented and 
discussed in detail in the next sections. As the one-time-pad 
encryption with keys unknown to the attacker gives perfect 
secrecy, it should be concluded that the perfect secrecy in 
encryption has to be provided by the secure transmission of the 
encryption keys by the KeyBITS Platform. 
The security of this transmission starts with the fact that 
optical quantum noise is irreducible (cannot be reduced or 
eliminated) in principle, regardless any technological capability 
of the adversary.  
Furthermore, the process of recording instances of this 
quantum noise (a classical procedure) and adding it to each 
coded bit sent is also irreducible for the adversary; nothing in 
the transmission channel can be done to diminish or eliminate 
it.  
In the wireless case or in an optical channel a measurement 
by an adversary always include noise. In the wireless case this 
recording is done within the KeyBITS Platform and transmitted 
to the public channel. This is the fundamental protection used 
in the KeyBITS technology. 
As will be shown, a classical privacy amplification process 
will also be applied with the function of discarding any 
infinitesimally information leak to the adversary.  It also avoids 
attacks on past or future keys in case the adversary succeeds in 
obtaining a sequence of used keys from a transmission round.  
For authentication purposes the transmitted signals can be 
subject to an additional layer of encryption based on 
conventional public key cryptography (PK) allowing 
compliance with certification standards. Zeroing of all the 
critical security information can be forced upon any tamper trial 
over the Platform. The KeyBITS Platform can be set to satisfy 
the most stringent levels of the Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules (FIPS 140-2). 
The first part of the paper provides a general description and 
a few technical details about the KeyBITS technology. More 
details are given in the Appendix. The Appendix also has a 
section comparing the KeyBITS Physical Random Bit 
Generator with other physical generators. A final section 
compares rough order of magnitude costs between QKD and 
KeyBITS. Finally, steps required to achieve a fully functional 
KeyBITS Platform are posited 
II. KEYBITS PLATFORM 
HE KeyBITS Platform is designed to generate 
cryptographic keys, to distribute them through classical 
channels in a secure way, and to do so without using couriers. 
These functions will be discussed in this paper. First, the 
generation of bits is discussed and second, the secure 
distribution process is explained relative to its dependence on 
physical noise and on a privacy amplification process. 
 
A. Entropy source for the Physical Random Bit Generator 
The generation of keys uses optical quantum fluctuations in 
a laser beam. A light field, similar to that of an amplitude 
stabilized laser, also known as a coherent field, presents 
spontaneous fluctuations of photon numbers of an 
uncontrollable character. These fluctuations of quantum origin 
are also known as “optical shot noise”. 
Using a laser with a long coherence time 𝜏𝜏 (time where the 
laser keeps a constant phase 𝜙𝜙) and taking light intensity 
samples within short time windows of duration Δ𝑡𝑡 (Δ𝑡𝑡 ≪ 𝜏𝜏), 
fluctuations can be seen.  They are directly related to the photon 
number fluctuations 〈(𝑛𝑛 − 〈𝑛𝑛〉)2〉 ≡ 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2 characteristics of the 
coherent field. 
The light intensity presents an average value 〈𝐼𝐼〉 around 
which the fluctuations 𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼 (or Δ𝑛𝑛) occur. Fluctuations occurring 
above or below the average physical signals are recorded and 
represent the desired bits. These signal generations cannot be 
reproduced by any algorithm and are purely of a quantum 
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origin.  This entropy source produces bits in a completely 
different process from pseudo-random generators that utilize 
algorithms to produce random-like sequences of bits but have a 
deterministic characteristic at their core. 
Figure 1 sketches the elements that constitute the Physical 
Random Bit Generator (PhRBG), which generates keys from 
quantum fluctuations in a light field. Details can be seen in 
Appendix X.B. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  A light beam is intensity sampled by a fast detector at instants ti within 
time windows Δt. The resulting current is amplified (G). The analog signals 
pass to an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) and the digitized voltage levels 
are classified above or below average producing a stream of random voltages (V+, V−) representing the physical bits. 
 
Figure 2 shows the PhRBG. Records of the quantum 
fluctuations (optical shot noise) are also shown in the computer 
display. Comparisons of the keyBITS PhRBG with other 
physical random number generators can be seen in Appendix 
X.L 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  On the left is a PhRBG on a table.  Note that the display shows the 
random fluctuations obtained from the laser beam.  On the right are components 
of the PhRBG. 
 
B. Key distribution: Transmission and Receiving Stations 
This distribution process is an evolution over a similar 
scheme carried over an optical channel, where the cloak effect 
produced by the 𝑀𝑀-ry coded signals was imposed by the optical 
fluctuations existing in the optical carrier itself, the laser beam. 
Now the same cloak effect is achieved by adding over every 
classical coded bit signal a distinct recorded noise component. 
These noisy signals are recorded instances of measurements 
(samplings) taken on the quantum fluctuation signals. While in 
the optical channel the noise is always present, in the classical 
channel it has to be added bit-by-bit. 
Random keys generated by the PhRBG in a emitter station A 
are coded (discussed below), transmitted and received by 𝑁𝑁 
receiving stations (1,2,3, …𝑁𝑁). See Figure 3. Station A contains 
the PhRBG, an optical noise source, light detectors, amplifiers 
and processing electronics and software; it is hardware based 
with dedicated software. These elements are the main 
components of the KeyBITS Platform. The Platform is kept 
within an air gap (=region with no continuous direct contact 
between the interior and the exterior) to avoid direct attacks by 
hackers. Communication with the outside is controlled to 
minimize attacks. Signals coming out from the Platform inside 
the air gap reach a PC or processor with an outside IP 
connection or any other private radio network that will direct 
the generated keys to the 𝑁𝑁 receiving stations. 
  The receiving stations have a receiving unit inside an air gap 
and a PC or processor with the software to process the received 
information. Sometimes the letters A and B are used for these 
stations. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  At left the key transmission station (TX) is shown where the KeyBITS 
Platform is inside an air gap. Communication with the receiving stations (RX) 
is done by a PC or processor that has a controlled communication with the 
Platform. The RX stations are software-based and communication with the 
exterior to the processing PC is accomplished in a controlled way. Signals sent 
from TX to the RX are processed in a similar way inside TX and inside any RX 
so that the same distilled keys result in TX and RXs. The processing unit for 
key distillation is called “Bit Pool”. RX stations will decode the sent signals to 
extract the signal bits originally generated by the PhRBG in TX. 
 
The receiving stations are mainly software-based and with 
capacity to process the received raw key stream. This 
processing has the purpose of obtaining a distilled fresh key 
stream to be used for encryption. The same distillation process 
in done in the emitting station so that the emitter and the 
𝑁𝑁 receivers become equipped with identical sets of distilled 
keys necessary for symmetric encryption. 
Due to the acceptance of general communication channels 
the system can choose a different network route in case of 
rupture (forced or accidental) of the channel in use. This may 
provide a very resilient system against disruptive attacks to the 
communication channels available to the users. 
 
C. KeyBITS Platform blocks 
The KeyBITS Platform can be roughly represented as a three 
blocks with distinct functionalities: The PhRBG, the Noise 
Generator and the Bit Pool. See Figure 4. 
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Fig. 4.  The keyBITS Platform is located in the transmission station TX. Three 
blocks compose the Platform: The PhRBG, a Noise Generator, and a Bit Pool. 
The PhRBG is the key generator modulus where keys are generated from 
quantum fluctuations in a laser beam. They are detected, amplified, digitized 
and classified as signals above and below average intensity values of the laser 
beam. The resulting stream of digitized random bits enters the Bit Pool. The 
same laser beam is split (for economical reasons) and is directed to a second 
detection unit detecting the independent fluctuations in intensity. They are 
amplified and digitized. This is similar to the PhRBG process. These digitized 
signals are also injected into the Bit Pool. The Bit Pool functions are discussed 
next. 
III. THE BIT POOL 
HE Field Programmable Gated Array (FPGA) is a very 
convenient way to have a multitude of operations done in a 
dedicated programmable hardware instead of software, it brings 
an appreciable gain in speed: It is used in the Platform. 
The Bit Pool in the KeyBITS Platform can be implemented 
in the same FPGA that performs the classification signals that 
output bit signals (digitized voltage signals) in the PhRBG. An 
adequate FPGA model with two inputs should be chosen: One 
for the bits coming from the PhRBG and the other one from the 
Noise Generator. The FPGA should have enough memory for 
processing the data necessary for the privacy amplification 
steps. 
From the start, the Bit Pool contains a sequence of length  
𝑏𝑏0 of random bits secretly shared by A and B (RX receiving 
stations)  (These bits were originally generated by the PhRBG 
as a secret coding sequence to create an initial 𝑀𝑀-ry set bases to 
code a fresh sequence of 𝑎𝑎 bits (𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, … ) generated). This 
initial secret coding sequence 𝑠𝑠 is the information advantage 
legitimate users have over any attacker. How this initial 
sequence is shared? At some moment in time A and B have to 
have a first contact. Say that B is a member of a team directed 
by A and they meet for instructions.  Or else, B is a client 
opening an account in bank A. Many other examples can be 
given. 
Each 𝑀𝑀-ry basis gives a random voltage value that is added 
to the voltage representing one of the bits in 𝑎𝑎. To generate each 
basis 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑀𝑀, 𝑚𝑚 bits are needed: 𝑀𝑀 = 2𝑚𝑚. Therefore, to send an 
initial sequence of 𝑎𝑎 fresh bits one needs 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 bits to form all 
bases to encode the bits from 𝑎𝑎. The initial sequence is then 
𝑏𝑏0 = 𝑏𝑏0,1, 𝑏𝑏0,2, 𝑏𝑏0,3, … 𝑏𝑏0,𝑚𝑚×𝑎𝑎.  
𝑏𝑏0 is partitioned in blocks of size 𝑚𝑚 and each block codes 
each bit of 𝑎𝑎. The first basis, for the first bit of 𝑎𝑎, is given by (𝑏𝑏0,1, 𝑏𝑏0,2, … 𝑏𝑏0,𝑚𝑚) and so on. The specific 𝑀𝑀-ry basis number 𝑘𝑘 
corresponding to this set of random bits is 
𝑘𝑘0,0 = (b0,m 2𝑚𝑚−1 + ⋯+ b0,2 21 + b0,1 20). 
 
In the next paragraphs one general round of sharing 𝑎𝑎 bits 
will be described for which A and B already shared a sequence 
of bases bits 𝑏𝑏 of length 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 obtained from the former round. 
By doing this, to any voltage representing a bit sent 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  (∈ 𝑎𝑎) 
another voltage 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  derived from the random bits 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 is added: 
     
 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
 
The operation given by this sum (1) yields the voltage 
corresponding to the bit 𝑎𝑎 = 0 or a=1 plus the basis voltage. 
The resulting signal is classical (can be assumed precisely 
known) and, as such, it can be identified precisely within the 
𝑀𝑀-ry bases set: Although the specific basis voltage is random, 
it is generated by an algorithm connecting the random variable 
𝑘𝑘 -one among 𝑀𝑀 possible values given by the shared set of 𝑚𝑚 
bits. This algorithm could be the alternating function for 𝑘𝑘 
values odd or even: 
 
 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀 − 1 − (−1)𝑘𝑘2 �,     (𝑘𝑘 = 0,1,2,3, …𝑀𝑀 − 1)  , (2) 
 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 gives the voltage difference between bits spaced by 
even and odd values of 𝑘𝑘. The basis indicator 𝑘𝑘 will sometimes 
be dropped from the notation 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘) for simplicity. 
Recall that 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a voltage value representing one basis in the 
𝑀𝑀-ry coding and derived, through 𝑘𝑘, from the shared blocks of 
𝑚𝑚 bits in 𝑏𝑏. In other words, 𝑚𝑚 random bits give 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑘𝑘 gives 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘).  
Although 𝑘𝑘 is randomly chosen and 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 follows it, the 
mapping given by (2) is assumed to be known by the attacker – 
but not the specific k  value used. By studying this map and by 
guessing the possible bit value, the attacker could recover the 
basis used. Consequently, it is not enough for the users A and 
B to use this coding to protect a transmitted bit; the adversary 
could break it. 
The aim of the noise generator shown in Figure 4 is to 
eliminate this recover operation: It creates random bits 
representing noise values 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 that are added to 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  before 
sending the signal to B (or RX). This noise amplitude is 
judiciously chosen such that it covers several possible bases 
voltages.  This cloaking effect frustrates the attacker on his aim 
for basis identification (or identification of the bit sent from A 
to B). 
These cloaked signals are sent from A to B. The amplitude 
of this added noise 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is such that the noise covers several bases 
in the neighborhood of the actual basis used.  
Bases values are separated by 2𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/𝑀𝑀 and the noise 
amplitude is limited to be ≪ 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  to guarantee high fidelity in 
recovering bits by user B:  If one recalls that users A and B 
know every basis sent, a simple subtraction of 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 from 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖, gives (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖) − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖.  
The value 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  gives the bit voltage sent 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 plus a bit of noise 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖. As this noise is small (≪ 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚) the user B can easily recover 
the 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 bit sent as well as the whole sequence 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3,… .  
T 
 5 
 
By doing this the generated bit sequence 𝑎𝑎 sent to RX is now 
known by A and B.  An example is given in the next section. 
A and B now share a sequence of bits of size  𝑎𝑎 + 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎.  
The privacy amplification protocol (PA) in the Bit Pool [22] has 
to distill from this shared 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 bits two new sequences:  
1) A random set 𝑧𝑧 of bits over which the attacker have no 
information whatsoever. This set 𝑧𝑧 will be used as keys 
for encryption, and 
2) Another fresh sequence of size 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 to be used as the 
bases for the next round.  
These steps will be discussed ahead. 
IV. CODING, DECODING AND NOISE 
HE following simulations are used to illustrate the 𝑀𝑀-ry 
coding, decoding and the noise effect on a sequence of bits.  
 
A. M-ry coding 
Figure 5 shows voltage value of the first 40 bases within a 
total of 𝑀𝑀 = 256 bases. Typical voltage values and physical 
parameters are used. From now on the index 𝑉𝑉 will be dropped 
from 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for simplicity – 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is given by Equation (2). 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a 
voltage while the sequence of bits given the specific 𝑀𝑀-ry basis 
number 𝑘𝑘 (∈ 𝑀𝑀) is derived from bits 𝑏𝑏. 
 
Fig. 5.  An example of generation of bases levels with the M-ry coding. Values 
were set for bits 0:  a=0V, and for bit 1:  a=3V. Here 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 was set arbitrarily to 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚=3V. 
Although bases in Figure 5 are ordered in 𝑘𝑘 for illustration 
purposes, each 𝑘𝑘 is randomly chosen when coding a bit. The 
coding proceeds bit by bit. The number of levels 𝑀𝑀 used 
depends on the digitization supplied by the ADC. Typical 
values are 28, 210, … . ADC financial cost increases with the 
number of bits 𝑚𝑚 = log2𝑀𝑀 = 8,10, … and the speed offered. 
The FPGA applies the cyclic condition given by: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼[𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏(𝑘𝑘) > 2𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚] write 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏(𝑘𝑘) −2𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 , otherwise write 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏(𝑘𝑘).  
 
This cyclic condition reduces the span of voltage values to a 
maximum value of 2𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚. The minimum voltage separation 
between bases is (2𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚)/2. See Figure 5. 
 
B. A fresh bit sequence 
Consider a sequence of 64 bits: 
 
𝑎𝑎 = 100111000010011111011110010100 1101011001101100101001101111001010. 
 
The circuitry map these bits as voltages values. Consider that 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0 (bit 0) will be represented by 0𝑉𝑉 and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 1 (bit 1) by 1𝑉𝑉. Figure 6 shows this sequence of bits. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  A sequence of 64 bits represented as voltage values, where a bit 0 is 
arbitrarily represented by 0V and a bit 1 by 1V. 
C. 𝑀𝑀-ry coding a bit sequence 
The 𝑀𝑀-ry coding uses the sequence of 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 bits secretively 
shared by A and B. For each bit 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 a fresh sequence of 𝑚𝑚 bits 
define the basis 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 for 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖. Assume, as an example, that this 
sequence of bases numbers chosen at random (levels within the 
𝑀𝑀 bases) is given by k: 
 
 𝑘𝑘 =  (96,115,151,82,129,242,96,79,58,195,224,8,208, 251,230,77,156,146,15,32,8,7,215,212,38,225,249, 106,84,9,254,252,202,219,223,86,84,173,238,237,247, 157,124,250,159,40,144,100,132,137,16,230,3,231,102, 132,112,51,193,54,253,62,102,246,128,64,72,136,43, 190,3,166,5,46,148,208,76,149,32,11,175,211,198,175, 248,86,26,99,61,168,34,105,47,137,121,10,64,126,52, 62,211,252,228,87,223,22,134,83,197,78,155,22,77, 150,110,167,199,28,236,182,94,240,206,9,96,155, 95,136,241,198,49,177,157,85,137,13,167,123,14,95, 198,85,0,84,196,53,145,51,22,32,194,196,84,2,42, 234,86,50,230,15). 
(3) 
 
The voltages corresponding to these bases 𝑘𝑘, call them 
𝑏𝑏,  are shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  A sequence of voltage values corresponding to random bases shown in 
list b are shown. 
 
T 
6  
 
D. Bits in coded bases 
Figure 8 shows bits coded in the 𝑀𝑀-ry bases 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 where 
the set 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 is given by 𝑘𝑘 (3). 
 
 
Fig. 8.  A sequence of voltage values corresponding to a distinct basis coding 
every bit. 
As the bases sequences are known only by A and B but not 
by the attacker, it may give the impression that only this secretly 
shared information could be enough to protect the in-transit 
information. However, the transmitted signals are classical and, 
in principle, any level of resolution of voltage signals could be 
assumed. An attacker examining signals coded with only this 
protection could use the generic algorithm for bases generation 
given by (2) and by comparison with the transmitted signals 
could infer both the bases and the bits sent. 
To avoid that and safeguard the information, an extra layer 
of protection given by the optical noise is added to the coded 
signals as described below. 
 
E. Bits in coded bases with added noise 
The red points in Figure 9 show the effect when noise is 
added to the coded signals (black points). Although the 
differences between noiseless and noisy signals are not large, 
the separation between black and red points is usually greater 
than the separation between two nearest bases 2𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/𝑀𝑀. In this 
example, 𝑀𝑀 = 28 was used, but if 𝑀𝑀 = 210 was chosen, the 
separation between nearest bases decreases by 4 times. The 
desired net effect of the added noise is that the attacker cannot 
identify which basis or bit was used in any signal emission. The 
noise spans a voltage range around a coded bit sent, and this 
cloaks basis and bit sent. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Coded bit voltage (black points) added to noise voltage (red points). 
 
F. Subtracting the bases information shared by A and B 
Receiver B now possesses the total signal sent by A shown 
in Figure 9. The attacker also has a recording of the same total 
signal but has no knowledge of the sequence of bases used. At 
the same time, both A and B know the bases used. 
This is the information advantage that the users have over 
the adversary: B just subtracts the information on the 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 
bases used (64 in this illustration) initially shared and obtains 
the result shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  B subtracts the information of the bases used and recovers the 
sequence of bits sent. Observe that these bits still keep the added noise signals 
but that does not prevents B to obtain the bit sequence. A simple rounding 
operation is needed (See Figure 6) for a perfect recovery of the bits 𝑎𝑎.  
This result shows the importance of the information 
advantage created by A and B over the attacker thanks to the 
added noise signals. These noise signals present no formation 
rule and cannot eliminated or separated from the total 
transmitted signal. 
V. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION PROTOCOL IN THE BIT POOL 
 and B (or TX and RX) now possess the common 
knowledge of the starting shared key of length 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 used 
to create a first set of coding bases for 𝑎𝑎. A and B also shared a 
fresh key sequence of bits 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, …    (See Figure 6). 
  With these shared bits, the privacy amplification protocol 
(PA) creates a new set of bases (length 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎) and a sequence 
of bits 𝑧𝑧 (smaller than 𝑎𝑎) for which the attacker has no 
knowledge and which could be used for one-time-pad 
encryption. The new set of bases provides a renewed secret 
shared by A and B (a fresh information advantage) to yield a 
new round of fresh keys sent from A to B. The key distribution 
process could then proceeds. 
  At this stage there are a few problems to be solved. The first 
one is that although the attacker have been frustrated at his 
intentions to obtain the bit sequence 𝑎𝑎 there is a probability, in 
principle, that he has obtained some correct bits in his trials. 
Could this knowledge jeopardize someway the distribution 
process by allowing an increasing knowledge of the attacker 
about the sent keys? 
  Advancing the answer without explanations it will be shown 
that the potentially acquired information by the attacker is 
completely negligible due to the recorded noise that cloak the 
signals.  Furthermore, procedures in the PA protocol eliminates 
A 
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any residual information eventually left. Details are given in the 
Appendix XI.C.  
As the intensity noise has a Gaussian probability around the 
voltage value assigned to 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖, a probability for the attacker 
to hit the right ``bit+𝑀𝑀-ry basis" exists. This probability for any 
single emission 𝑖𝑖 can be written 𝑡𝑡1 and the probability for all 
sequence 𝑎𝑎 is 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡1 × 𝑎𝑎.  If 𝑡𝑡 is less than one-half (in fact it 
results in a much smaller number) the PA protocol [5] teach us 
that the attacker's knowledge can be reduced to an infinitesimal 
amount. 
In each round there are 𝑎𝑎 (bits) + 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 (bases) in the bit 
pool, known by A and B, and over which the attacker may know 
a very small number of them. There are ways to eliminate this 
small statistical knowledge obtained by the attacker. A couple 
of possibilities are mentioned ahead. The choice of the protocol 
has to take into account the overhead imposed by the protocol 
itself because these operations reduce the overall throughput 
rate of the key distribution process. 
 
VI. UNIVERSAL HASH 
URING the data transmission (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 coded in 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 bases plus 
noise) from A to B an instance of a universal hash function 
𝐼𝐼 is set (it may include AES, Toeplitz matrices etc). A and B 
both apply the same hash operation to the sequence 𝑎𝑎 (bits) +
𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 (bases) to generate an output that keeps the same length 
as the input: This hash operation produces an extra 
randomization over the sequences possessed by A and B. 
This hashed sequence passes by other transformation to 
eliminate the attacker's knowledge: The calculated number of 
bits 𝑡𝑡 potentially obtained by the adversary is used to reduce 
the initial number of bits 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 to a smaller number 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑡𝑡 
(see [27]): 
 
 {0,1}𝑛𝑛 → {0,1}𝑛𝑛−𝑡𝑡. 
 
(4) 
In other words, a number 𝑡𝑡 of bits is destroyed from the 
sequence 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏.  An extra number of bits 𝜆𝜆 is reduced as a 
security parameter [5]: 
 
 {0,1}𝑛𝑛−𝑡𝑡 → {0,1}𝑛𝑛−𝑡𝑡−𝜆𝜆 
 
(5) 
where {0,1}𝑛𝑛−𝑡𝑡−𝜆𝜆 is the final sequence of bits, with length 𝑟𝑟 =
𝑛𝑛 − (𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆). 
This reduced number 𝑟𝑟 of bits is grouped as follows: 
 
 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆 = (𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏) − 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆 = (𝑎𝑎 − 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝑏𝑏= (𝑎𝑎 − 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆) + 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎
≡ 𝑧𝑧 + 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎. 
 
(6) 
The sequence of size 𝑧𝑧 ≡ 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆 is the sequence of fresh 
bits to be used for encryption. The sequence of size 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 will 
form the new bases 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 for the next round of bit distribution. 
Perfect secrecy: Fresh keys 𝑧𝑧 were then acquired by and A 
and B without using a courier. The attacker has no information 
on 𝑧𝑧.This makes possible utilization of OTP encryption with 
secure keys 𝑧𝑧 and therefore achieving the perfect secrecy level. 
It should also be observed that even if an attacker could 
obtain a sequence 𝑧𝑧 for one round, say, from a known-plaintext 
attack or any other means, no past or future bit sequence is 
compromised; the PA protocol protects each round 
independently. Distilled bits in one round are uncorrelated with 
distilled bits from any other round. This is made possible by the 
process of continuous injection of entropy into the Bit Pool at 
every round – with fresh bits generated by the PhRBG. 
Bennett [27] says that after reducing the initial number of bits 
from 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎, (𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 initially shared to create bases 
and 𝑎𝑎 fresh bits) to 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑛𝑛 − (𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆),  the amount of information 
that may be known by the attacker is given by the Mutual 
Information 𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆. 
Corollary 5 (pg. 1920) in [27], gives the information in bits 
leaked to the attacker: 
 
 
𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆 = 12𝜆𝜆 × 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛2 = 12𝑛𝑛−(𝑡𝑡+𝑟𝑟) × 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛2 
 
(7) 
Observe that the high level of security achieved is due to the 
small amount of information leaked to the attacker – and this 
small amount was enforced by the physical noise added to the 
signals and the privacy amplification procedure. 
Appendix XI.J gives the details and numerical estimates of 
the degree of security achieved as measured by the Mutual 
Information 𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆. 
In conclusion, users A and B have a means to keep sharing 
in a secure way fresh keys from a continuously generating 
source (PhRBG). At each round a new set of bases of length 
𝑚𝑚 × 𝑎𝑎 is generated and, a set of 𝑧𝑧 are available for encryption. 
The size 𝑧𝑧 obtained is reduced from the original size 𝑎𝑎 by (𝑡𝑡 +
𝜆𝜆). This reduction is the overhead of the process. Numerical 
examples will be given in Appendix XI.I. 
Figure 11 summarizes the privacy amplification protocol 
steps. 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Summary of the privacy amplification steps. 
 
VII. ONE-TIME-PAD ENCRYPTION 
NE-TIME-PAD encryption can proceed over any channel 
with perfect secrecy and with the speed given by the 
generation rate of 𝑧𝑧. This will be roughly the bit generation rate 
of the PhRBG minus the overhead for PA occurring in the Bit 
Pool. 
D 
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A. Decentralized encryption 
Figure 12 shows a TX station and up to N RX stations. The 
one-time-pad encryption works between one-to-one users (say 
TX and one RX) but can also work between one-to-N as (say 
TX to N RX) or as well as any arbitrary number of users in the 
network. 
A decentralized possibility for encryption based on a same 
set of encryption of keys may be particularly useful for a team 
with N members [28].  
This decentralized use proceeds as follows. Assume that TX 
has distributed a certain number of coded information with 
added noise random keys to N users (that form a team) and that 
software will automatically apply the same distillation process 
given by the PA protocol (It is assumed that these users pre-
shared a sequence of random keys to form a set of 𝑀𝑀-ry bases). 
All team members will obtain the same set of fresh 
encryption keys 𝐾𝐾 (𝐾𝐾 may be a large number of sequences 𝑧𝑧). 
See Figure 12. 
 
 
Fig. 12. TX sends to N RX a sequence of coded bits with added noise. All 
stations perform the PA operations and end up with a sequence of fresh bits K. 
Assume these 𝐾𝐾 bits are arranged in a square matrix form. 
See left side of Figure 13 as an example. Lines can be 
enumerate from top to bottom sequentially 1,2,3, … √𝐾𝐾. 
 
 
Fig. 13.  At left, arrangement of the K bits in a square matrix. At right, an 
example of randomly choosing lines in the matrix. 
Consider that one user “n” wants to send to user “m” a 
message with length equal to one  line in that 𝐾𝐾 matrix. User 
“n” chooses randomly 20 lines in the 𝐾𝐾 matrix (see right side 
of Figure 13 and applies an XOR operation over these 20 lines: 
 
 𝐾𝐾4 ⊕ +𝐾𝐾8 ⊕ …𝐾𝐾1022,       (20 sequences) (5) 
 
This obtained XOR sequence is the sequence of bits to 
encrypt bit-by-bit the message 𝑀𝑀: 
 
 𝐶𝐶 = (𝐾𝐾4 ⊕ +𝐾𝐾8 ⊕ …𝐾𝐾1022) ⊕𝑀𝑀 
 
(6) 
The encrypted message 𝐶𝐶 is sent to user “m” with a header 
containing the numbering of the encryption lines (that were 
“XOR”-red). Decryption is easily done by “m” because he 
holds the original sequence 𝐾𝐾.  For a different number of lines 
an obvious extension of the procedure can be employed. 
The attacker does not know 𝐾𝐾 nor even the content of any 
line. At most the attacker could have obtained the order of lines 
in the header of the encrypted message 𝐶𝐶. 
The collision probability to have the same line chosen in 
another encryption by any user can be calculated as well as to 
have a collision of all the lines. These (very low) probabilities 
are calculated in Appendix XI.K .  
In the decentralized use of a batch of keys, one estimate is 
that after multiple uses all keys in the total number of keys 
would have been used at least once, the process can start from 
the beginning. In case of one-to-one encryption the used keys 
could be discarded immediately after use while for the 
decentralized case keys they can be discarded only after a 
renewing process for all users happens. Figure 14 illustrates a 
possible one-to-one key distribution and encryption and a one-
to-N key distribution with decentralized encryption. 
 
 
Fig. 14.  Left side - A ground station distribute keys to a drone that by its turn 
sends encrypted images continuously to the ground station. Right side - A 
central unit TX send keys to N users.  Decentralized encryption assures secure 
communication among the team. The technology cost is divided among users. 
Many applications can be derived from the keyBITS 
technology. Figure 15 shows an example of protection of 
transportation structure that could be compromised, adversely 
affecting air traffic if maintenance data falls into the hands of 
terrorists. 
 
 
Fig. 15.  Securing maintenance data transmission for transportation structures 
in the nation. 
 
B. OTP Graphical Interface 
A very easy-to-use Graphical Interface was developed so that 
the user only has to point to file to encrypt and to path to the 
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stored key. All random choices are used and encryption is done 
in a fast way and made disposable to the user. It performs the 
tasks of Encryption and Decryption using the decentralized 
protocol. All operations are rapidly accomplished in the 
background. Figure 16 shows the basic interface. 
 
 
Fig. 16.  Friendly-to-use Encode/Decode Graphical Interface. 
 
VIII. COST COMPARISONS BETWEEN KEYBITS AND 
QKD 
LTHOUGH costs of installed QKD systems are not readily-
available, rough estimates can be made based on specific 
cases. The Quantum Key Distribution case known as Tokyo 
QKD Network [29] is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
Fig. 17.  Tokyo QKD network. 
This network has 6 stations. The stations use close to 289  km 
of optical fibers, 6 pairs of QKD stations, at least 3 switches, 1 
router and transmission cables. Infrastructure costs in U.S. 
dollars can be estimated:  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 62 × 103/km for the cost of a 
km of fiber, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 2 × 105 for each pair of QKD Alice/Bob 
stations, and about 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 50 × 103 for computers, routers, 
switches and cables. A rough equipment cost of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 3.2 ×106/station is obtained: Total of $ 19 × 106 . The cost is linear 
with the number of stations starting with a minimum of two 
stations.  Estimates for operational expenses is dependent on 
organization-specific factors and is not included here.  
Accounting for these can be done with a cost-benefits analysis. 
The KeyBITS platform can operate station to station with 
independent connections or in the decentralized mode with one 
Platform connected to 𝑁𝑁 receiving stations. When KeyBITS is 
considered as an independent entity, the cost is linear for a 
group of two end-points.  In the decentralized case the main cost 
of the Platform (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃) is roughly calculated as 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃/(𝑁𝑁 + 1) Figure 
18 depicts the cost decay as a function of the number of users 
N. It is assumed that the users already have PCs or other 
communication devices with installed KeyBITS privacy 
amplification programs. 
 
 
Fig. 18.  Costs as a function of the number of decentralized users N. Platform 
cost estimated at 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$25 × 103. 
With a rough estimate of  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 25,000  for each Platform, 
two stations with one Platform each, costs 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 50,000  (to be 
compared with the QKD cost of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 3.2 × 106). For the 
decentralized configuration consisting of one Platform and 100 
users, the average per user cost would be 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈$ 248.  
These KeyBITS costs are based on the use of commercial 
components procured at unitary prices. Components procured 
in bulk will realize appreciable price reduction. Furthermore, 
miniaturization of the Platform for a large chip size could 
produce an even higher cost reduction. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
HE KeyBITS Platform for Key Generation, Secure 
Distribution and Encryption was based on several novel 
ideas. Proven security properties of KeyBITS that outperform 
other encryption methods are: 
• Physically generate keys, using the quantum 
fluctuations in a laser beam. No generation algorithm 
exists. 
• Proven secure distribution of keys. Signals are 
protected by physical noise and privacy amplification 
procedures. Each sequence of distilled keys 𝑧𝑧 has no 
A 
T 
10  
 
correlation with past or future sequences of distilled 
keys; the distillation is compartmentalized round by 
round. 
• Secure transmission of data, images, voice using one-
time pad encryption. Distinct services are possible 
over the same Platform: from military uses to IoT, 
protection of financial or medical data transmission, 
and so on. 
• Continuous and fast key distribution without use of 
couriers. 
• The optoelectonics system is stable with no use of 
interferometry. 
• Key generation is fast and dependent only on the 
speed of the electronics. The physical principles used 
accept higher speeds. 
• Miniaturization is possible for a large chip size. 
• Can be built with commercial parts. 
• Easy-to-use Graphical User Interface to 
encrypt/decrypt. 
The KeyBITS technology does not use Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD) protocols: It was developed to be faster and 
cheaper than QKD, without restrictions for long range 
communications. Transmitted signals are classical, telecom 
standard, but carry recorded optical noise of quantum origin to 
create a physical cloak that hides the signal bits transmitted. 
The KeyBITS Platform starts generating cryptographic keys 
in a fast (> 2𝐺𝐺bit/𝑠𝑠) process, continuously, by using a novel, 
patented technology that resulted in the KeyBITS Physical 
Random Bit Generator (PhRBG). The entropy source of bits are 
the quantum fluctuations (optical shot noise) of a laser field. 
The bit generation rate is above 2Gbit/sec with the current 
electronics and only bound by electronic circuitry. Any 
advances in electronics can be incorporated in the system 
because the quantum fluctuation process is very broadband 
(white noise). The overhead for the distillation of encryption 
bits is due to the 𝑀𝑀-ry coding used and the privacy 
amplification protocol; the corresponding speed overhead 
cannot be eliminated but it can be minimized by using a faster 
electronics. 
Another unique, novel KeyBITS feature is the decentralized 
encryption for multi-users. After first sharing identical keys for 
N users, the technology allows ongoing decentralized encrypted 
communication among the N users. 
This novel generator (PhRBG) can function as stand-alone 
equipment and as such can be marketed independently of the 
Platform. 
It was demonstrated that the one-time-pad encryption can be 
revived with the KeyBITS technology. A system to give perfect 
secrecy for all in-transit communication, fast and low cost 
compared with QKD technologies is now within our reach. 
X. APPENDIX 
A. Perfect secrecy - One Time Pad 
Shannon [30] discussed the entropy 𝐻𝐻 of an information 
source of variables 𝑥𝑥  (𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋) characterized by a set of 
probabilities 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) 
 𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥) = −�𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)log2
𝑚𝑚∈𝑋𝑋
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) (7) 
The symbol 𝑋𝑋 can be attached to a sequence of random 
variables 𝐾𝐾, to a message 𝑀𝑀, an encrypted text 𝐶𝐶 and so on. For 
binary variables, 𝐻𝐻(𝑥𝑥) can be measured by “number of bits”. 
The conditional entropy 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) gives the uncertainty in 𝑋𝑋 
when 𝑌𝑌 is known: 
 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) = −��𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)log2
𝑦𝑦∈𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚∈𝑋𝑋
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦), (8) 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) is defined as 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥|𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥,𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦)
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦)  . (9) 
 
An encryption system with key 𝐾𝐾, to offer some uncertainty 
to an attacker, has to conform to 
 
 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀|𝐶𝐶) ≤ 𝐻𝐻(𝐾𝐾|𝐶𝐶). (10) 
 
An encryption system offering perfect secrecy must meet this 
parameter: 
 
 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀) ≤ 𝐻𝐻(𝐾𝐾) , (11)  
 
It must have a state such that the randomness of the key is not 
less than the randomness of the message. 
The Mutual Information 𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋;𝑌𝑌) between random variables 
𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 measures the information (in bits) obtainable for the 
variable 𝑋𝑋 after 𝑌𝑌 is known. It is defined by 
 
 𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋;𝑌𝑌)= ��𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)
𝑦𝑦∈𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚∈𝑋𝑋
log2 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦) . (12) 
 
Vernam's cipher (in binary) where the cipher text 𝐶𝐶 is 
achieved by the addition (modulus 2) of the message 𝑀𝑀 (|𝑀𝑀| =
𝑁𝑁) and the key 𝐾𝐾 (|𝐾𝐾| = 𝑁𝑁):  𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀⨁𝐾𝐾, gives the Mutual 
Information (please note that 𝐾𝐾 is assumed uniformly 
distributed): 
 
 
𝐼𝐼(𝑀𝑀;𝐶𝐶) = � �𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚, 𝑐𝑐)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚∈𝑀𝑀
log2 𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐|𝑚𝑚)𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐)= � �𝑃𝑃(𝑚𝑚, 𝑐𝑐)
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚∈𝑀𝑀
log2 1/2𝑁𝑁1/2𝑁𝑁 = 0  . 
(13) 
 
The above gives the assurance that if the attacker comes into 
possession of the transmitted encrypted text 𝐶𝐶, nothing with 
certainty about the message 𝑀𝑀 is obtained. 
The quantities 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) or 𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋;𝑌𝑌) are expectation values based 
on probabilistic calculations. In other words, they may indicate 
the probabilistic outcome or number of bits possibly obtainable. 
In this sense the result 𝐼𝐼(𝑀𝑀;𝐶𝐶) = 0 will be understood as a 
negligible number of bits obtained using accepted probabilistic 
calculations. 
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B.  Physical Random Bit Generator (PhRBG) - details 
  The PhRBG is an opto-electronic device designed to 
continuously generate and supply bits to when high speeds are 
required. The physical principle involved, quantum vacuum 
fluctuations that produce the optical shot-noise, is not 
bandwidth limited; device speed can be adapted to all electronic 
improvements. Important differences between the PHRBG and 
other quantum random bit generators include no need for 
interferometry and that a single detector is used whereas some 
other generators require two. This architecture yields a time-
stable system. 
  The PhRBG is currently implemented with commercial-off-
the-shelf components including low cost amplifiers (See G in 
Figure 1). These amplifiers have a frequency dependent gain 
profile (a monotonous high gain at low frequencies) that 
introduces a low frequency bias in the bit generation. 
a) Laser Power Spectrum 
Figure 19 shows typical spectra from a diode laser of the type 
utilized in the PhRBG. 
 
Fig. 19.  Laser power spectrum with different light intensity levels. The spectra 
are not flat as ideally desired. Several filtering and external features can be seen. 
Filtering occurs at several stages: the optical filtering at the detector's glass 
window (passage band from infrared to UV) and at distinct frequency 
dependent impedances in all electronic stages including at the amplifiers. The 
filtering produces a final frequency response increase at low frequencies. These 
distortions, or deviations, from an ideal flat frequency response enhance the 
occurrence of slow phenomena as compared to the fast ones. 
Correction of these frequency distortions can be done with a 
more-elaborate electronic circuitry (which is costly) or 
accomplished by an auxiliary randomization using, for 
example, a Linear Feedback shift Register (LFSR) -an 
inexpensive solution to break the occurrence of systematic 
features. 
  To compensate for this bias without increasing costs the 
LFSR is used in series with the bit output to produce an extra 
randomization. This breaks the long sequences of repeated bits, 
which are expectedly more rare. The process does not reduce 
the speed of the PhRBG. 
As currently implemented, the PhRBG operates at ∼2.0 Gbit/sec and passes all randomness tests to which it was 
submitted, including the NIST suite described in [23]. 
Saturation signals are another feature related to the resolution 
presented by the ADC. Whenever the voltage related to the 
intensity fluctuations rises above the maximum allowed ADC 
voltage, a null or saturation response occurs. From the other 
side, if the noise is below the voltage corresponding to the 
resolution of the ADC the system, no faithful response is 
obtained as well. 
Recall that the Poissonian photon fluctuation with an average 
intensity 〈𝑛𝑛〉 presents a photon number fluctuation 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 = �〈𝑛𝑛〉  
. The relationship of noise-over-signal becomes 
 
 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛
〈𝑛𝑛〉
= 1
�〈𝑛𝑛〉   . (14) 
 
That is, for high 〈𝑛𝑛〉, the ratio 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛/〈𝑛𝑛〉 can become exceedingly 
small, below the sensitivity of the ADC. 
Correction of the problem can be done with an ADC of 
increasing resolution: the spectra shown in Figure 19 were 
achieved with an ADC of 28 levels. An ADC with 210 levels 
would present less saturation and so on. Again, correction is a 
question of the cost/benefit ratio. 
 
b) Fibonacci LFSR 
Figure 20 shows a Fibonacci LFSR used to produce the 
auxiliary randomization. It is sequenced to operate immediately 
after the electronic output of bits (IN gate) and output the mixed 
signals (OUT gate) and without speed loss. 
 
 
Fig. 20.  The raw random bit stream employs a Fibonacci's LFSR as an auxiliary 
step to break bias created by the amplifier gain profile of the. There is no speed 
decrease. 
The resulting bit output passes all NIST and other 
randomness tests. Figure 21 exemplifies main features of the bit 
output. 
 
 
Fig. 21.  Left - Frequency spectrum of the randomized bit output and examples 
of repeated sequence analyses. Transforming (0,1) sequences onto (-1,1) 
sequences allows the spectrum analysis with “white-noise” character of the 
output signals. Right - Sequences of repeated elements obey the expected 
probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘) = 1/2𝑘𝑘: Solid line is theory and points the experimental data. 
For a distribution where the probabilities to occur a 0 or 1 are 
equal, 𝑝𝑝 = 1/2. It is expected that the probability of a sequence 
of 𝑘𝑘 identical bits (either 0 or 1) occurring is 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘) = 1/2𝑘𝑘.  If 
one changes basis 2 to basis “e” the equation is 
 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘) = 12𝑘𝑘 = 𝑒𝑒−𝑘𝑘 ln 2 ≅ 𝑒𝑒−0.693 𝑘𝑘  . (15) 
 
Data in the right side of Figure 21 were fitted to 𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛) = 𝑐𝑐 ×
𝑒𝑒ln 2
1−𝜀𝜀 𝑛𝑛, where 𝜀𝜀 will indicate a depart from the distribution 
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𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘) = 1/2𝑘𝑘. Dots are obtained from ~1.3 × 106 bits and the 
solid lines shows the fit to 𝑐𝑐 = 319880 ± 193 and 𝜀𝜀 =
−0.003 ± 0.002. 
In summary, some corrections to deviations from ideal 
conditions, such as a non-flat gain G, could present different 
costs. Usually, a more inexpensive solution is chosen to achieve 
the desired goals. 
The raw data for the histograms are given by lists 𝐿𝐿1 and 𝐿𝐿2: 
 
𝐿𝐿1 = {{1, 159676}, {2, 79651}, {3, 40253}, {4, 20017}, {5, 9864}, {6,4960},  {7, 2567}, {8, 1239}, {9, 623}, {10, 313}, {11, 156}, {12,59}, {13, 37}, {14, 21},  {15, 9}, {16, 8}, {17, 3}, {18, 4}, {19, 1}, {20, 0}, {21, 0}} 
𝐿𝐿2 = {{1, 159805}, {2, 79964}, {3, 39766}, {4, 20021}, {5, 9892}, {6, 4962}, {7, 2488}, {8, 1306}, {9, 630}, {10, 336}, {11, 148},   {12,71}, {13, 42},  {14, 10}, {15, 11}, {16, 6}, {17, 2}, {18, 0}, {19,1}, {20, 1}, {21, 1}}  
Observe that the deviation parameter 𝜀𝜀 gives an estimate of 
the deviation from the ideal expected behavior. In this fit it is 
shown to be very small, an estimate of the randomness 
associated with the generated bits. 
 
C. Privacy amplification and perfect secrecy 
The perfect secrecy goal is achieved by associating random 
optical signals in the coded transmitted signals and a somewhat 
conventional PA protocol that relies heavily on the effects of 
the random noise signals. The two parts will be discussed 
separately below. 
The random noise will delimit the amount of information that 
an attacker could obtain from the 𝑀𝑀-ry coded bit superposed 
with noise. This leaked information will be represented by 𝑡𝑡1.  
The PA software eliminates these residual statistical data that 
could have been acquired by the attacker. Sequences of fresh 
random bits 𝑧𝑧 for encryption results; the attacker can obtain no 
practical information. 
 
D. Detected Physical Signals - from photon numbers to 
voltages 
Photon (or light) detection in general has a long history (See, 
for example [31]). Some basic formulae that aid in describing 
the physical signals are presented here. These represent each bit 
inside the KeyBITS Platform that will be transmitted between 
encoder and decoder. 
While all collected formulae won't be demonstrated here,  
these can be considered intuitively acceptable. For those 
wanting to consult a single reference to check derivations for 
these formulae, please see Sections F through H in [32]. 
The circuitry shown in Figure 1 can be represented by the 
diagram in Figure 22. 
 
 
Fig. 22.  Equivalent circuitry representing the detection components of the 
PhRBG. R and C are the equivalent impedance elements (resistance and 
capacitance) of the voltage detection equipment represented by the ADC. The 
voltage V represent the analog voltage signals that will be discretized by the 
ADC in 𝑀𝑀 voltage levels. 
 
The light beam interacting with the detector, with power 𝑃𝑃, 
contains an average photon number 〈𝑛𝑛〉 per unit of time 
(perhaps, for example 1sec):  〈𝑛𝑛〉 1. This gives 
 
 𝑃𝑃 = 〈𝑛𝑛〉 1ℏ𝜔𝜔0 , (16) 
 
where 𝜔𝜔0 is the laser frequency in radians/sec. 
The photon number statistics for a coherent laser beam is 
Poissonian: 
 
 
𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛) = 𝑒𝑒〈𝑛𝑛〉 〈𝑛𝑛〉 𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛!   . (17) 
 
The process inside the detector creates a photocurrent 𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒  
(here 𝑒𝑒 refers to the electric charge) that, by its turn, presents a 
Gaussian distribution: 
 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒) = 1
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒√2𝜋𝜋 𝑒𝑒−(𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒−〈𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒〉)22𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2   . (18) 
 
Crossing the 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 impedance the electrons generate a voltage 
𝑉𝑉 that also follows a Gaussian distribution: 
 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑉𝑉) = 1
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖√2𝜋𝜋 𝑒𝑒−(𝑉𝑉−〈𝑉𝑉〉)22𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉2   . (19) 
 
The detection theory provides the value 
 
 〈𝑉𝑉〉 = 𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅〈𝑛𝑛〉1  . (20) 
 
where 𝐺𝐺 is the amplifier gain, 𝑒𝑒 is the electric charge, and 𝑅𝑅 is 
the detector efficiency. It also gives 
 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑅𝑅2𝐶𝐶 �𝐺𝐺2𝑒𝑒2𝑅𝑅〈𝑛𝑛〉1 + 2 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅 �  , (21) 
 
where 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵  is Boltzmann constant and 𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾  is the temperature in 
degrees Kelvin. The second term gives the voltage fluctuations 
due to thermal effects in the circuit. 
From the 𝑀𝑀-ry coding of bits and the addition of noise 
introduced in Section IV, conditions for protection and recovery 
of in-transit signals by the legitimate users can be defined. 
The basic assumption is that the signal bit as well as the bits 
added for the noise were created by uncontrollable optical 
fluctuations and not by the background noise caused by thermal 
effects. This can be assured by the choices of 〈𝑛𝑛〉1 and G. Noise 
caused by thermal effects can be technically reduced by using 
lower temperatures, while the inherent optical noise in 
unaffected. 
The physical fundamental equations for many estimates of 
the security are given by Eqs. (19) to (21). 
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a) Optical fluctuations stronger than thermal induced 
electrical noise 
 
Eq. (21) shows that for optical fluctuations bigger than the 
fluctuations imposed by the thermal part one should have 
 
 
𝐺𝐺2𝑒𝑒2𝑅𝑅〈𝑛𝑛〉1 ≫
2𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾
𝑅𝑅
 
(22) 
 
that can be satisfied by adjusting 𝐺𝐺2〈𝑛𝑛〉1. It should also be 
recalled that the ADC resolution, or  “Least Significant Bit” 
(𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵, measured in voltage), given by the separation of its 
discrete levels, should be smaller than the optical fluctuation 
voltage 
 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒�
𝑅𝑅2𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅〈𝑛𝑛〉1 > 𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵  , (23) 
 
so that the voltage fluctuation is correctly detected. 
To calculate the 𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵 voltage one has to know the full-scale 
voltage (𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈) range of the ADC used and its number of 
discretization levels 𝑀𝑀. Taking, for example, 𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈 = 5𝑉𝑉 −(−5𝑉𝑉) = 10𝑉𝑉, 𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵 = 10𝑉𝑉/𝑀𝑀, where 𝑀𝑀 is created by a 
number of bits 𝑚𝑚:𝑀𝑀 = 2𝑚𝑚.  𝑚𝑚 = (8,10,12,14, … ), one obtains  
 
 10𝑉𝑉28 = 39𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉  , 10𝑉𝑉210 = 9.8𝑚𝑚𝑉𝑉  , …  . (24) 
 
E. Physical conditions for secure transmission of signals 
a) Added optical noise smaller than bit separation 
voltage 
The digitized minimum voltage separation in the ADC is 
related to the specific number of levels 𝑁𝑁 of the ADC and is 
given by the ADC number of the bits (8 bits →28 levels, 10 bits → 210 levels , etc) and to the maximum 
voltage span 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚   allowed. The minimum separation is then 
Δ𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/𝑁𝑁. Eq. (2). It defines the voltage 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  that 
separates bits 0 and 1. For example, 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  could be set at 
𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2. This condition gives 
 
 2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≪ 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚2  , or 4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≪ 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 (25) 
 
b) Added optical noise covers many bases 
The total noise around one coded bit sent must be much 
bigger than the separation between nearest coded bits in the 𝑀𝑀-
ry bases: 
 
 2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
�
𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀
�
≫ 1 , or  2𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≫ 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚   . 
 
(26) 
 
c) Conditions obeyed 
The set of practical basic conditions to be obeyed allowing 
security in the key distribution process are given by Eqs. (22), 
(23) and (24).  
Figure 23 shows the surfaces 2𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,  〈𝑉𝑉〉  and  4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 as a 
function of gain 𝐺𝐺 and optical power 𝑃𝑃. 
 
 
Fig. 23.  Optical and electrical conditions obeyed by the keyBITS Platform. V 
(in Volts) is the electrical output due to bit, bases and noise signals. Here it was 
used 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚=〈V〉. Observe that conditions 2𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≫ 〈𝑉𝑉〉 ≫ 4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 are obeyed, as 
required for secure transmission. Parameters were set at 𝑀𝑀 = 1024, 𝑅𝑅 =0.5,𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾 = 300𝐾𝐾,𝑅𝑅 = 50𝛺𝛺,𝐶𝐶 = 1 × 10−12𝐹𝐹. The electrical noise due to 
thermal effects gives 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = 64𝜇𝜇𝑉𝑉. 
 
For an ADC with a maximum span of voltage of  𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 =20𝑉𝑉, one could choose the voltage for a bit 1 equal to 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2 =10𝑉𝑉. This value can be set to equal the 〈𝑉𝑉〉 output from the 
ADC for a given set of parameters 𝑀𝑀,𝐺𝐺,𝑃𝑃. This chosen value 
has also to obey the conditions (25) and (26).  
Figure 24 exemplifies this choice in a log scale for clarity. 
The surfaces      log10〈𝑉𝑉〉, log102𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,  log104𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖  and   log10(𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2) are shown.  
 
Fig. 24.  Surfaces  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙10〈𝑉𝑉〉,  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙102𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,   𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙104𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,  and  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙10𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2. 
Value 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2 = 10𝑉𝑉 is located at the crossing of the 
surfaces log10〈𝑉𝑉〉 and log10𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2, see dashed green line. In 
particular, for 𝑃𝑃 = 662𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 and 𝑀𝑀 = 210 = 1024 the result is log10〈𝑉𝑉〉=𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2 = 10𝑉𝑉 and 2𝑀𝑀𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/2 = 31𝑉𝑉  and 
𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
2
− 4𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 9.9𝑉𝑉. Conditions (25) and (26) are obeyed with 
these settings. 
 
F.  The attacker probability of error 
It is opportune to comment that in the transmission of signals 
by an optical channel, such as an optic fiber with phase 
modulation, the variance of the noise component depends on  
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 1/〈𝑛𝑛〉1 instead of 〈𝑛𝑛〉1 (See [5]).  The voltage fluctuations used 
in the Platform are proportional to 〈𝑛𝑛〉1. Phase and amplitude 
fluctuations do not commute in the quantum domain (although 
they are not conjugate variables in the canonical sense). 
Therefore, their behavior variances are similar to 
complementary variables (or Fourier conjugate variables in the 
classical domain); this is the reason for a distinct dependence of 
the variances on 〈𝑛𝑛〉1. 
The signals in the Platform are classical, and the fluctuation 
increasing with the power intensity seems to indicate that strong 
power would be ideal. But detection of the fluctuations are 
bound by the resolution of the ADC:   For higher intensity (∝
〈𝑛𝑛〉) the ratio 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 /〈𝑛𝑛〉 = 1/〈𝑛𝑛〉 is too small; the ADC becomes 
insensitive -although 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 is larger. The ADC cost increases with 
a better resolution.  The quantum phase modulation case [5] and 
the wireless case with the intensity variable lead to distinct 
calculations for the probability of the desired variables - one is 
necessarily quantum and the other one uses classical probability 
functions. 
Figure IV-5, previously shown, gives an example of the 
sequence of signals carrying voltages corresponding to 
bits+coding bases+noise voltages.    
Figure 11, previously displayed, shows the decoding applied 
by the legitimate user by simply subtracting the known bases 
sequence. In that example 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚  was set to 1𝑉𝑉. 
The attacker does not know this sequence, but consider this 
situation: Assume he receives the red dot signal (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖) 
seen in Figure 10. Take this voltage close to the correct 
noiseless signal as seen in Figure 6. The attacker knows that the 
noise would have randomly displaced the voltage value, but he 
also knows that the coding procedure creates alternate bits to 
the closest signals –see Figure 5. There are many signals with 
the same bit (see red and blue dots in Figure 5). By chance he 
may have hit the right bit. If the bit sent was a blue one, he could 
hit it by chance if the signal was coming from any to the blues 
ones or, he could err if the bit was a red one (any of the red 
points). The two sets are displaced from each other by one 
(small) separation 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚/𝑀𝑀. 
Designating 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅, the probability of hitting the right 
configuration of bits (blue or red set of points) that represent the 
bit sent and by 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊 the probability to hit the wrong 
configuration, it is known that one of the cases will occur.  
Therefore 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅+𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊 = 1. 
It is also known that the noise has a Gaussian distribution that 
will be centered on the signal 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , and that the probability 
of success will be maximum at this point. 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 and 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊 can be 
written in a normalized form as 
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒−(𝑗𝑗 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/2𝑀𝑀)22𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉2𝑀𝑀−1𝑗𝑗=0(𝑗𝑗 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛)
∑ 𝑒𝑒
−
(𝑗𝑗 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/2𝑀𝑀)2
2𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉
2𝑀𝑀−1
𝑗𝑗=0
 
 
(27) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒−(𝑗𝑗 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/2𝑀𝑀)22𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉2𝑀𝑀−1𝑗𝑗=0(𝑗𝑗 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)
∑ 𝑒𝑒
−
(𝑗𝑗 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/2𝑀𝑀)2
2𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉
2𝑀𝑀−1
𝑗𝑗=0
 
(28) 
 
At this point one should realize that the maximum probability 
of error in a coin tossing is not zero but 1/2. As a counterpart, 
the minimum probability of success starts at 1/2 and not at 0. 
This minimum for the probability of success defines 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = 12 + 12 (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 − 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊) (29) 
 
The first 1/2 accounts for the minimum value of 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 and the 
second considers one group of points - upper or lower line in 
Figure IV-1. The minimum value of 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 (= 1/2) would be the 
maximum for the probability of error 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒. This leads to 
 
 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 (30) 
 
Figure 25 shows 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠  and 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 for a range of parameters. 
 
 
Fig. 25.  Probabilities for error of an attacker, 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 and success 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠, for a set of 
parameters and 𝐺𝐺 = 500 and 𝐺𝐺 = 1000. 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 values are obtained from Eq. (21) 
with parameters and constants 𝐶𝐶 = 1 × 10−12𝐹𝐹, 𝑒𝑒 = 1.6010 ×10−19𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏, 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵 = 1.38 × 10−23𝐽𝐽/𝐾𝐾,  𝑅𝑅 = 50𝛺𝛺, 𝑅𝑅 = 0.5, 𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾 = 300𝐾𝐾. The 
maximum error that the attacker can make is to achieve the level of 1/2 
equivalent to a pure coin tossing for the guessing of each bit. This 1/2 coin 
tossing level is also the minimum for 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠. 
 
It should be observed that the fluctuation increases with the 
laser power 𝑃𝑃 (or 〈𝑛𝑛〉1). See Eq. (21). A higher fluctuation 
induces more errors for the attacker; fluctuation also increases 
with the gain 𝐺𝐺;  𝑃𝑃 and 𝐺𝐺 are easy parameters to control. Figure 
26  shows 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 as a function of 𝐺𝐺,𝑀𝑀 and three values of the light 
power 𝑃𝑃. 
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Fig. 26.  𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 as a function of 𝐺𝐺,𝑀𝑀 and three light powers 𝑃𝑃 =0.1𝑚𝑚𝜇𝜇, 0.5𝑚𝑚𝜇𝜇, 1𝑚𝑚𝜇𝜇. 
G.  Probability of error at station B 
One may assume that when subtracting the shared bases to 
extract the bits sent, an exceptionally large noise fluctuation has 
been recorded.  With the encoded bit signal setting, the 
extracted signal close to the wrong encoded bit line causes a 
reading error by B. See Figure 10. The probability 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 for a 
so large fluctuation causing one error can be estimated from 
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 = 𝑒𝑒−(𝑗𝑗 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/2𝑀𝑀)22𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉2
∑ 𝑒𝑒
−
(𝑗𝑗 𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/2𝑀𝑀)2
2𝜎𝜎𝑉𝑉
2𝑀𝑀−1
𝑗𝑗=0
 
(31) 
 
Estimating the wrong line distant at 𝑞𝑞~(3/4)𝑀𝑀 from the 
correct one, Figure 27 shows that 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 → 0. In other words, 
the error associated by the legitimate user hitting the wrong set 
of points is practically zero. 
 
 
Fig. 27.  1  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙10 of B's probability of error 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 for a large noise fluctuation 
giving values around (3/4)𝑀𝑀 for 𝑀𝑀 = 210 and 𝑃𝑃 = 300𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇.  The probability 
is completely negligible.                
 
H. Mutual information and speed overhead 
As discussed in Section V, for each signal sent there is a 
probability that the attacker succeeds in obtaining an amount of 
information 𝑡𝑡1 about the bit. After 𝑛𝑛 bits sent, the total number 
of bits probabilistic leaked to the attacker will be 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡1 × 𝑛𝑛.
  
𝑡𝑡1 can be identified with the probability of success given by 
Eq. (29) and, therefore, 
 
 
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑛𝑛 × �𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 12�  . (32) 
 
Eq. (32) establishes that only bits with probabilities above 1/2 could be leaked in a useful way to the attacker. 
The PA protocol demands that this number 𝑡𝑡 of bits must be 
destroyed as well as an extra number 𝜆𝜆 (=security parameter; 
see [27]. In other words, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆  bits are reduced from the set 𝑛𝑛. 
This has two main effects: one is that the distilled key 𝑧𝑧 will be 
shorter than the original length 𝑎𝑎; the other is that this reduction 
implies in a slowdown from the process of key generation in the 
PhRBG to the final encryption key 𝑧𝑧 at the output. 
 
I.  Bits left after privacy amplification 
The fraction 𝐼𝐼 of the bits left to be used compared to the 
initial input 𝑛𝑛 is 
 
 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑛𝑛 − (𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆)
𝑛𝑛= 𝑛𝑛 − �𝑛𝑛 × �𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 12� + 𝜆𝜆�
𝑛𝑛
 . 
(33) 
 
Figure 28 illustrates the dependence of 𝐼𝐼 as a function of the 
number of levels 𝑀𝑀 and the security parameter 𝜆𝜆. 
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Fig. 28.  Bit fraction 𝐼𝐼 left after privacy amplification as a function of the 
number of bases 𝑀𝑀 used and the number of bits used as the security parameter 
[27]. In this example 𝑛𝑛 ≃ 17𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.       
 
Figure 29 shows the bit fraction 𝐼𝐼 left for 𝑛𝑛 ≅ 33𝑘𝑘bit. 
 
Fig. 29.  - Bit fraction 𝐼𝐼 left for 𝑛𝑛 ≅ 33𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. 
J. Bits erased after privacy amplification 
In other to emphasize the bit overhead produced by the PA 
protocol, Figure 30 shows the fraction erased from the initial 
number of bits, for the given conditions shown. 
 
Fig. 30.  Bit fraction erased 𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜  as a function of the number of levels 𝑀𝑀. In 
this example the security parameter is fixed and equal to 𝜆𝜆 = 10000 for 34𝐺𝐺𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
sent. The mutual information I is 2−9999. Notice that when the number of levels 
𝑀𝑀 is too low, the number of bits that need to be erased is very high -a high 
overhead. However, for large 𝑀𝑀 a large number of bits remains. The higher 
number of useful bits demonstrates the need of an ADC with more bits (usually 
more expensive).   
 
As the security parameter defines the mutual information 
value, a large λ results in high secrecy. At the same time to have 
a small fraction of rejected bits, the initial number n = a + m ×a must be high. This suggests use of runs with long sequences 
of bits instead of short sequences in separate emissions. The 
size of these long sequences will be determined in practice by 
the existing FPGA memory capacity. 
Summarizing, a practical perfect security is achieved for key 
distribution.  This assures the perfect security for encryption 
with the distilled bits. The overhead for this process comes from 
the use of M-ry bases for each bit send (giving a m = log2M 
reduction in speed from the rate of key generation) plus the bit 
fraction erased from the original number of bits n = a + m ×a → r = n − (t + λ). 
The overall gain in benefits is salient:  the absence of distance 
limitation, use of any transmission channel including 
commercial networks, low cost, and the use of OTP without the 
need for couriers to refresh keys in a continuous process. 
 
K.  Collision probability for the decentralized encryption 
Section VII.A introduced decentralized encryption. The 
meaning is that a single Platform can generate the same set of 
keys for 𝑁𝑁 users and these users can encrypt messages among 
them not relying on the key source for each encryption done. 
This may be handy for members of a team that need to exchange 
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messages among them, one-to-one or one-to-many, in a way 
that simplifies key management.  
One may ask what happens if two users choose the same lines 
of encrypting keys (see Figure 13) to encrypt different 
messages. This is referred to as collision probabilities. 
  Define the collision probability [33] so that two among 𝑁𝑁 
users choose a same line (one collision) within the matrix with 
𝑑𝑑 (= √𝐾𝐾) lines: 
 
𝑃𝑃1𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑁𝑁,𝐾𝐾) = 1 − 𝑑𝑑!(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁)𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁
≈ 1
− �1 − 𝑁𝑁2𝑑𝑑�𝑁𝑁−1  . 
(34) 
 
Figure 31 shows 𝑃𝑃1𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑁𝑁,𝐾𝐾) for 𝑁𝑁 = 2 to 20 and 𝐾𝐾 =107 to 109. 
 
Fig. 31.  Probability for one collision due to two users within 𝑁𝑁 users choosing 
the same line in the matrix representing the bits for decentralized encryption. In 
this example, 𝐾𝐾 goes from 10M bit to 1 Gbit. 
 
Estimating that the order of magnitude for 20 collisions is 
𝑃𝑃1𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝑁𝑁,𝐾𝐾)20, Figure 32 shows the numerical results. 
 
Fig. 32.  Estimate of 20 collisions due to two users choosing same lines in the 
matrix representing the bits for decentralized encryption.    
These numerical examples show that the decentralized 
encryption [28] provides a reliable and safe protocol that 
assures safe one-time-pad encryption/decryption among N 
users (assuming that the keys are safely stored and user access 
to storage is rigorously controlled).   
After a number of times of uses of the original batch of keys, 
these should be refreshed. This number of usages could be 
equivalent to a single use of all keys. 
 
L. Comparisons of the KeyBITS generator and other PhRNG 
For encryption at large volumes, a Physical Random Bit 
Generator must be fast with a reliable randomness at the output. 
Using examples of encrypting modest size pictures, and at the 
rate of 100,000 pictures in one hour, close to 1 Terabyte of keys 
per hour are needed. There are not many competitors working 
with physical random number generators requiring fast rates. 
Regarding Physical Random Bit Generators, among the 
existing technologies involving physical principles, those that 
exploit the quantum fluctuations of light are the most promising 
ones in terms of speed and true randomness (i.e., no algorithms 
to be explored by hackers). 
To illustrate the advantages of our generator over existing 
commercial technologies, and even not-yet-developed systems 
described in published physics research , below is a short list of 
generators representing a broad spectrum of optical 
phenomena. Each is compared to KeyBITS: 
1) Quantis (www.idquantique.com);  
2) Quintessence (www.quintessencelabs.com) 
3) Twin beams from Spontaneous Parametric Down 
Conversion (SPDC) (Applied Optics vol 48, No 9, 1774, 2009) 
4) “Performance of Random Number Generators Using Noise-
Based Superluminescent Diode and Chaos-Based 
Semiconductor Lasers” (IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in 
Quantum Electronics, Vol. 19, No. 4, July/August 2013) 
5) Radioactive emitters: Apart from laboratory studies a recent 
advertisement announced a commercial random generator, 
EYL, based on radioactive decay. 
For physical key generation an established competitor at low 
speeds (up to 16MHz) is the Quantis random number generator 
produced by ID-Quantique. For high speed, an example is the 
compact radioactive generator from EYL. 
The Quantis generator uses a weak beam of laser light where 
the photons in a laser beam are split by a beam splitter and 
detected by two separate detectors signaling bits 0 and 1. It 
processes up to approximately 10Mbits/second and cannot be 
made faster due to a physical limitation: More than one photon 
can be generated in a laser beam within a sampling time. 
Therefore, events where simultaneous photons reach both 
detectors have to be discarded. If the intensity of the laser is 
increased to improve the system’s bit generation, the equipment 
speed becomes useless due to this photon simultaneity in both 
detectors. This is an unsolvable limitation – not present in our 
system. 
Quintessence splits a light beam, sending light to two 
detectors. In principle, it is not subject to a speed limitation 
because it works with multi-photons. The two detectors work 
with subtraction electronics to extract the random fluctuations 
of light. The limitation is that it demands a strict splitting 
balance of the light intensity that requires continuous 
management; otherwise the signal subtraction from both 
detectors becomes inefficient, and the noise fluctuations are 
covered by the intensity signals. Our system uses a single 
detector, no interferometry, and simpler electronics and 
therefore presents a more elegant, easily managed, and robust 
system. 
Photon pairs generated by Spontaneous Parametric Down 
Conversion (SPDC) are superposed on a beam splitter, 
producing two-photon interferences. Single photon outcomes 
detected by four single photon detectors guarantee bit 
independence with no bias. However, the physical apparatus 
needed for this process cannot be miniaturized, it is costly and 
extremely slow for bit generation (below1Mbits/second). 
Therefore, it lacks commercial potential. 
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A research group at Saitama University proposed an 8.3 
Gbits/second random number generator based on optical 
sources. Their design is experimental and relies on expensive 
lab instruments, such as a digital phosphor oscilloscope. Other 
research groups have proposed similar experimental methods, 
but are either based on specialized lab instruments or have a 
significantly lower generation rate. 
Radioactive bit generators can be made compact but have an 
intrinsic speed limitation because increases in the rate of photon 
emissions rely on increasing the radiation level. Increases in 
radiation levels present health and safety risks and subjects the 
apparatus to regulatory constraints. The EYL generator works 
with clicks originated from radioactive processes at low 
radiation levels. For reasonable rates the amount of 
radioactivity can be kept low, but to increase the random bit 
output, the level of radioactivity must increase; an undesirable 
feature. 
Figure 33 shows the developed KeyBITS PhRBG. 
 
 
Fig. 33.  PhRBG and properties 
The KeyBITS generator can be miniaturized where needed 
to service an increasingly mobile workforce and operation. Its 
speed can be increased only depending on electronic advances, 
and no radioactivity is involved. Its simplicity, using only one 
detector and with no need for interferometric setups or subtle 
light balances have yielded a device with more desirable and 
utile characteristics than other PhRBG. Figure 34 compares the 
mentioned generators. 
 
 
Fig. 34.  Comparisons among some Physical Random Number Generators 
It may be interesting to see that sequences of bits from the 
KeyBITS generator have been used as a standard to compare 
distinct encryption protocols [34]. 
M.  Completion of the KeyBITS Platform 
Currently, the keyBITS Platform is being tested and the 
software for the PA protocol implemented. The effect of the 
optical noise on the 𝑀𝑀-ry coded signals have been demonstrated 
in several papers; for example [3] to [25]. It is suggested that a 
testing network be established and that testing for security from 
attacks on the in-transit communication  be done to demonstrate 
measurable results provided by these platforms. Results should 
be compared to those obtained from QKD experimental 
networks, such as the one controlled by Batelle Memorial 
Institute/Ohio (Columbus-Dublin network). 
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